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Fundamental rights for primates
Introduction
Ever sinceCharlesDarwin’s seminalwork, it has been clear
that adhering to views of the world which present the hu-
man being as “the pride of creation” or as the top of a
“great chain of being” cannot be justified. Despite the ex-
traordinary characteristics which human beings have de-
veloped over time, we should, according to Darwin, “bear
in mind that he (man) is but one of several exceptional
formsof primates.“[1]More precisely, the humanbeing be-
longs to an order of more than 300 primate species.[2]
Compared tomanyother animals, primates feature a large
brain, a complex social structure as well as a high phys-
ical and mental capacity to suer. However, all too of-
ten, these characteristics and abilities determine the fate
of those primates who do not belong to the species Homo
sapiens: For instance, nonhuman primates are considered
especially suited for biomedical research, they are exhib-
ited for amusement as well as for purposes of education
and conservation, and they are kept as exotic pets.
Themore scientific findings on the remarkable charac-
teristics of nonhuman primates we obtain, the more dii-
cult the moral justification of such practices becomes. Ac-
cording to one of the most crucial principles of fairness,
equal things should be treated equally and unequal things
should be treated in an unequal way. In this position pa-
per,wepoint out that despite nonhumanprimates andhu-
mans being unequal in some respects, the morally rele-
vant qualities — their mutual interest in not suering and
in not being killed — are of comparable value. Therefore,
nonhuman primates — like human beings — are entitled
to a fundamental right to life and a fundamental right to
bodily integrity.
This extension of legal protection to nonhuman pri-
mates via fundamental rights has become self-evident,
given the moral progress towards a non-discriminatory
society which we have been experiencing for several
decades. Not so long ago, people were considered inferior
and were discriminated against based on arbitrary crite-
ria such as their skin colour, ethnicity, origin or sex. These
allegedly primitive people were deprived of many, if not
all of their fundamental rights. Forced labour, serfdom,
mistreatment and the refusal of appropriate political rep-
resentation are only a few examples of the injustices that
befell these people. In many places, intensive societal de-
bates led to the integration of these people into the cir-
cle of those bearing fundamental rights and, thus, to the
recognition of their interests as equally valuable in both
moral and legal terms. Slavery and serfdomwere formally
abolished, and people who once had to perform forced
labour are now protected in their fundamental rights on
both the national and international level.[3] Women ob-
tained franchise and complete property rights.[4] The in-
terests of children and disabled people are nowadays pro-
tected by fundamental rights as well.[5] Recent decades
have witnessed additional progress taking place in terms
of LGBT rights.[6]Despite the remaining roomfor improve-
ment, these cases of bothmoral and legal progress consti-
tute essential milestones in creating a more just society.
Yet empathy and the rational application of moral and le-
gal principles such as fundamental rights ought not only
to apply to human beings, but also to nonhuman animals.
This position paper aims to highlight why the interests of
nonhuman primates need to be protected by fundamen-
tal rights. In Switzerland, for instance, we demand in a po-
litical initiative the introduction of a fundamental right to
life and a fundamental right to bodily andmental integrity
for nonhuman primates at the cantonal level. Emphasis-
ing the particular abilities and interests of nonhuman pri-
mates, the following chapters show how current national
legal provisions and their implementation still subordi-
nate even the most essential of these interests — those of
life and integrity — to trivial human interests. Hence, we
argue that primates need to be protected by the funda-
mental rights to life and integrity inorder toguarantee that
their vital interests are respected. We conclude by show-
ing that potential objections and reservations against the
demand for fundamental rights for nonhuman primates
prove unfounded.
Fundamental rights for primates
Primates
Biological systematics and distribution
Primates constitute a particular order within the class
of mammals and comprise both human and nonhuman
primates.[7] The order of primates can roughly be divided
as illustrated in figure 1.
Within the superfamily apes, the two families gibbons
and hominids are distinguished. The latter comprises the
two species of orangutan, the two species of gorilla, chim-
panzees, bonobos and humans.[8] Since the beginning
of the 1990s, however, some scientists have proposed to
classify humans, chimpanzees and bonobos within a sin-
gle genus,[9] based on more recent findings in genetic re-
search. Comparing genes in human beings to those in
chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and Old World mon-
keys, as well as in mice, researchers find that humans and
chimpanzees are most closely related: they share 99.4%
identity at functionally important DNA sites— “those scru-
tinized and shaped by natural selection.”[10] This genetic
evidence provides support for two previously proposed
taxonomic changes: firstly, that the family Hominidae
should include all extant apes; and secondly, that the
genus Homo should include the three extant species and
two subgenera,Homo (Homo) sapiens (humankind),Homo
(Pan) troglodytes (the common chimpanzee), and Homo
(Pan) paniscus (the bonobo chimpanzee).[11]
Nonhuman primates living in the wild can be found in
Africa, India, Southeast Asia and South America.[12] How-
ever, many nonhuman primates are held in captivity, es-
pecially in North America and Europe. They are oen kept
in zoos or in cages by either private companies or public
institutions. In Switzerland, for instance, 251 nonhuman
primates were used in research in 2014,[13] and Basel Zoo
alone held around 130 nonhuman primates in 2015.[14]
Characteristics and abilities
Characteristics that all primates possess — apart from
physical properties like specialisednerveendings inhands
and feet highly adapted to grasping[15] — include ex-
traordinary behavioural traits and abilities. Among other
things, primates show high social intelligence whose
emergence and development is ascribed to the require-
ments of their complex social life.[16] Young primates stay
dependent on adults for a relatively long time. This al-
lows them to learn the relevant skills for surviving and liv-
ing in a complex social group.[17] This includes the ability
to feel empathy towards other primates.[18] The findings
of a study on rhesus macaques, for example, show that
they prefer to go without food if doing so allows them to
save their fellows from electric shocks.[19] Furthermore,
primates grieve for deceased relatives and friends.[20]
Just like human primates, nonhuman primates learn
socially through a process which is stimulated first by
the mother and later by extended groups.[21] By applying
the “do-as-I-do“ learning technique, primates teach each
other how to forage for food, rummage through thewood-
lands and make and use tools.[22] In particular — but not
only — with regard to great apes (hominids), such activi-
ties aredescribedas cultures and traditions.[23] For exam-
ple, in West Africa, two groups of chimpanzees have been
observed cultivating dierent traditions: members of the
group living west of the river Sassandra-N’Zo crack nuts in
a specific way, while members of the group living east of
the same river donot cracknuts at all, even though there is
a comparableamountofnutsonbothsidesof the river.[24]
Equally remarkable are the communication skills dis-
played by nonhuman primates. Through vocalisation and
various gestures, they are able to exchange feelings, plans,
and ideas, both with their fellows and with individuals
of other species. For this purpose, they have distinctive
sounds and dialects which are unique to their groups.[25]
Certain primates have even learned to communicate us-
ing abstract symbols. For example, Kanzi— a bonobowho
lives with the Ape Cognition and Conservation Initiative
(ACCI) in Iowa, and whose cognitive skills have been stud-
ied for decades — is proficient in more than 400 lexigrams
(i.e. symbols on a keyboard). This allows him to communi-
cate with humans about objects, places, activities, experi-
ences and future plans.[26] In another case, chimpanzees
who had learned a sign language from humans were sub-
sequently able to teach it to younger chimpanzees, the lat-
ter successfully learning the language without additional
human assistance.[27]
Furthermore, primates are able to put themselves in
the position of other individuals. For instance, some pri-
mates actually fool others by anticipating their behaviour;
that is, they pay attention to what the others see, hear
or intend to do, and go on to adapt their own behaviour
accordingly.[28] This behaviour is linked to primates’ abil-
ity tomentally travel in time: they are able to both remem-
ber past events and foresee future ones. Contrary to pop-
ular belief, recent studies have shown that primates are
able to anticipate future needs (such as hunger or thirst)
even though they do not yet feel the particular need at
that point in time.[29] Chimpanzee Santino, living in a
Swedish zoo, was even observed systematically collecting
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Figure 1: Primate taxonomy
and hiding stones and other projectiles which he would
later throwatgroupsof visitorspassinghis compound.[30]
Also, primates are able to recognise themselves in themir-
ror — an ability that researchers consider as evidence of
self-awareness.[31]
Finally, there is no doubt nowadays that all primates
are sentient beings. This is mainly explained by the
fact that they possess a highly developed central ner-
vous system with brains structurally similar to those of
humans.[32] Being able to feel physical as well as men-
tal pain, primatesmay suer frommental illnesses like de-
pression as well as from serious behavioural disorders in-
duced by negative experiences, like maternal neglect or
mistreatment.[33]
This overview shows that nonhuman primates are
individuals possessing high social intelligence, self-
awareness, a sense of the past and the future, as well as a
distinct ability for experiencing pain.
Animal welfare regulations
In many countries worldwide, animal welfare regulations
are in force that apply to nonhumanprimates. These regu-
lations dier substantially in the extent to which they pro-
vide legal protection to nonhuman primates. However,
even themostambitiousamong themdonotprovide sui-
cient legal protection: the core of nonhuman primates’ in-
terests in living and integrity remainsunprotecteddown to
thepresentday. This insuicient legal protectionhas a sig-
nificant real life impact, since the weighing up of interests
stipulated in animal welfare regulations usually disadvan-
tages any nonhuman animals involved. Hence, a serious
improvement of the protection of nonhumanprimates’ in-
terests can only be achieved by granting them fundamen-
tal rights which guarantee the protection of their interests
in life and integrity.
The following overview presents various international
demands for fundamental rights, highlighting the ways in
whichnonhumanprimates’ essential interests arenotpro-
tected to a suicient degree. In contrast to human pri-
mates, the core contentof these interests is not legallypro-
tected, and in practice nonhuman primates’ interests are
subordinated to even trivial human interests. Therefore,
nonhuman primates need the degree of legal protection
provided by fundamental rights which exceed existing an-
imal welfare regulations.
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International demands for fundamental rights and polit-
ical advances
The particular characteristics and abilities of nonhuman
primates has prompted both political demands for legal
changes as well as legal proceedings in dierent coun-
tries worldwide. Recently, various political advances have
aimed at improving the legal protection of nonhuman pri-
mates. In addition, there have been several lawsuits that
tried to set precedents for the rights of nonhuman pri-
mates. These approaches express the growing awareness
of the — at times striking — drawbacks regarding nonhu-
man primates’ legal protection.
In 1975, U.S. lawyer Stephen Burr proposed in a peer-
reviewed article “[...] an act establishing standards of care
owed to certain types of animals”.[34] Distinguishing be-
tween three dierent classes of animals, the standards de-
manded in his dra bill include the following protection:
animals in class A, i.e. themost cognitively advancedones,
including great apes, should have the right to life.
In 1980, a campaign to grant great apes the fundamen-
tal rights to life and integrity started in New Zealand.[35]
However, only aer the Great Ape Project (GAP) was
founded in 1993 by philosophers Paola Cavalieri and Peter
Singer[36] and became an international movement that
tries to achieve fundamental rights for great apes by po-
litical means, did the New Zealand campaign gain mo-
mentum. In an eort to include nonhuman great apes in
a "community of equals" with human beings, GAP cam-
paigns for granting chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans and
bonobos the fundamental rights to life, freedom and bod-
ily andmental integrity.[37]
The Great Ape Project New Zealand (GAPENZ) targeted
the country’s animal welfare legislation, which was then
under review. Enacted in 1999, the newAnimalWelfare Act
bans harmful experimentation on nonhuman hominids,
i.e. any nonhumanmember of the family Hominidae, be it
a gorilla, chimpanzee, bonobo, or orangutan. Hence, the
Act does not accommodate the demands for fundamental
rights articulated by GAPENZ, limiting its immediate im-
pact. Still, the new law can be considered a small but im-
portant step in “the legal dismantling of speciesismwithin
thehominid family”.[38] TheAct recognises those interests
of nonhuman hominids which cannot be easily trumped
by human interests. This is perceived as the Act’smost sig-
nificant asset as it arguably constitutes aquasi-right, i.e. at
least a weak right. Also, it is argued that the refusal to in-
clude specific rights in the Animal Welfare Act should not
be considered a rejection of the hominid rights concept as
such, but rather that the idea shouldbeput towider public
debate.[39]
In 2015, the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand pro-
posed amendments to the Animal Welfare Act of 1999,
which would prohibit the killing of nonhuman hominids
and provide a penalty for the oence.[40] The Green Party
perceives the need for such a right to life for non-human
hominids as a crucial follow-up in the Animal Welfare Act,
since the very stipulation that prohibits experimentation
on nonhuman hominids constitutes a danger for those in-
dividuals that canno longerbeused for thatpurpose. They
face a greater risk of being killed and are more vulnerable
to other kinds of abuse and exploitation, the Green Party
argues. In general, a prohibition on killing would protect
all nonhuman hominids in captivity without commercial
value.[41] However, the Animal Welfare Amendment Bill
failed.[42]
In Switzerland, the insuicient legal protection of non-
human primates has been questioned several times in the
formof parliamentarymeasures. In 2006, a parliamentary
initiative demanding a “Ban onmediumandheavily stren-
uous animal experiments with primates”[43] was submit-
ted, based on the report “Research on primates — an eth-
ical assessment” by the Swiss Federal Commission on An-
imal Experiments and the Swiss Federal Ethics Commit-
tee on Non-Human Biotechnology. In addition, the inter-
pellation “Marmoset experiment at ETHZ“ in 2006 as well
as the postulate “Experiments on primates“[45] in 2007
also aimed at improving the legal protection of nonhu-
man primates. More recently, a parliamentary measure
demanding a “Ban on straining animal experiments with
primates“[46] was submitted in 2015 (with no outcome
yet).
In Austria, the animal rights group Association Against
Animal Factories started legal proceedings on behalf of
chimpanzee Matthew (aectionately called “Hiasl”) in
2007. The group’s goal was to convince the judge to de-
clare Matthew a person and to appoint a legal guardian
that would represent Matthew in court. Primatologist
Volker Sommer and other experts supported the case sci-
entifically. The group argued that Austrian law recognises
all members of the genus “homo” as persons[47] — and
because chimpanzees share 99.4% of human genes, as
pointedoutbefore,[48] theybelong to this genus. Besides,
the biological definition of “person” refers to the posses-
sionofa “theoryofmind”whichchimpanzeesdohave. Be-
ing accepted as a person was a requirement for Matthew
to enforce his interests and to start legal proceedings in
which he could claim for damages against those respon-
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sible for his abduction in 1981 from Sierra Leone, when he
was ten months old.[49] Such compensation was needed
to secure his future, as the Vienna animal shelter where
Matthew lived began to encounter financial diiculties in
2006.[50] Appealing to the highest possible court, none
of the courts accepted the case, stating that the applicant
had no legal standing. Because no Austrian court had ad-
dressed thekey issueofpersonhood, insteadavoiding it by
refusing the case for technical reasons, the group decided
to file a lawsuit with the European Court of Human Rights
arguing that Matthew had been denied a fair trial.[51] The
European Court of Human Rights then rejected the case
as well, stating once more that the applicant had no legal
standing.[52]
The goal of this lawsuit was not to win fundamental
rights for Matthew (let alone for great apes or nonhuman
primates more generally). The goal was merely to ensure
that Matthew be recognised as a person instead of being
regarded as a thing — which would neither have required
any change of Austrian civil law nor have constituted a po-
litical decision.[53]
In Spain, the Parliament’s environmental committee
approved in 2008 a resolutionwhich aimed at implement-
ing the demands of the Great Ape Project (GAP). However,
nothing followed from this approval.[54] Thus, so far, fun-
damental rights for great apes do not exist in Spain.
In Germany, the Giordano Bruno Foundation submit-
ted in 2014 the petition “Fundamental Rights for Great
Apes” to the Bundestag. The petition — similar to the res-
olution in the Spanish parliament— demands the amend-
ment of Article 20a of the German Fundamental Law by
the following paragraph: “The right of great apes to per-
sonal freedom, to life and bodily integrity is protected.”
Well-known primatologists supported the petition, and
the Foundation also perceived approval for the demands
amongst themajorityof theGermanpopulation. However,
the announcement of the petitionwas rejected by theGer-
man parliament’s petition committee in the same year, ar-
guing the petition did not have any chance of success.[55]
In the United States — in contrast to Matthew’s case
in Austria — a Manhattan Supreme Court justice implic-
itly recognised in 2015 that chimpanzees could be con-
sidered legal persons and do have fundamental rights
to integrity and freedom. The Nonhuman Rights Project
(NhRP) had petitioned the Court for a writ of habeas cor-
pus, demanding to investigate the lawfulness of the chim-
panzees’ captivity.[56]
The Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP)was founded in
2007 by attorney Steven M. Wise. The group’s goal is to
change the current law that separates humans from non-
humans. More precisely, they try to achieve legal per-
sonhood for (initially) some of the most cognitively ad-
vanced animals, e.g. chimpanzees, elephants, dolphins,
and whales. These nonhuman animals should be recog-
nised as persons who have, inter alia, fundamental rights
to bodily integrity and to freedom; they should not be per-
ceived any longer as things which do not even have the
capacity to possess any legal rights. In order to gain such
legal rights for nonhuman animals, the organisation has
undertaken a long-term strategic litigation campaign. The
NhRP filed its first lawsuits in 2013 on behalf of captive
chimpanzees and plans to bring in further actions.[57]
Finally, in 2015, media announced that orangutan San-
dra, living in the Buenos Aires Zoo, had been granted un-
precedented legal rights in Argentina.[58] More precisely,
anArgentine appellate courtwas reported tohave issueda
writ of habeas corpus that had been petitioned by AFADA,
an Argentine animal rights organisation, on behalf of San-
dra. On closer inspection, however, it turned out that
“the court had neither issued a writ of habeas corpus, nor
granted Sandra personhood for any purpose, nor ordered
her to be moved to a sanctuary.”[59]
Similarly, but referring to animal rights more broadly,
Germany was reported by the media to have guaranteed
rights to animals back in 2002 in an amendment to its Con-
stitution (making it the first EuropeanUnionmember todo
so). The altered clause, obliging the state to protect ani-
mals, was presented as amilestone since “the federal con-
stitutional court will have to weigh animals’ rights against
other rights, like those to conduct research”.[60] Again, on
closer inspection, this legal change was not about animal
rights that would eectively protect animals’ interests (in
bodily integrity, e.g.) butmerely about animal welfare.[61]
Considering the progress in animal welfare regulations
worldwide may at least provide some cause for optimism
regarding animal rights and, more specifically, fundamen-
tal rights for nonhuman primates. In Switzerland, for ex-
ample, there have been several legal reforms aimed at im-
proving the status and protection of animals since the be-
ginning of the 1990s: in 1993, the “dignity of the creature”
was added to the constitution. In 2003, a change to the
Civil Codewas brought into eect, stating that animals are
in principle not objects. In 2008, the “dignity of animals”
was stipulated in the completely revised Animal Protec-
tionAct. Finally, in 2010, the internationally followed refer-
endum on the countrywide introduction of “Animal Attor-
neys” took place (the initiative failed, unfortunately).[62]
In Canada, the General Assembly of the Province of
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Quebec adopted a modification of the Quebec Civil Code
changing the legal status of animals from property to sen-
tient beings in 2015. The legislation states that "animals
are not things. They are sentient beings and have bi-
ological needs."[63] Recognising animals as sentient be-
ings instead of perceiving them as mere property may be
an important step towards granting them legal person-
hood. Equally, recognising animals’ biological needs may
be consideredapart of thepath to recognising their essen-
tial interests in living and in bodily andmental integrity.
In this regard, broader political advances worldwide
have aimed at improving the legal protection of animals
in general, including nonhuman primates. They per-
tained to animal experiments,[64] hunting,[65] and zoo
animals.[66]
Alongside these national measures, calls for funda-
mental rights for nonhuman animals are growing ever
louder at an international level. For example, the Univer-
sal Charter of the Rights of Other Species aswell as theDec-
laration of Animal Rights demand that nonhuman animals
be awarded the right to life, the right to bodily and men-
tal integrity, the right to freedom of movement and other
fundamental rights.[67]
Thisoverviewmakesclear thatour call for fundamental
rights to life andbodily andmental integrity for nonhuman
primates is part of a significant global movement.
Themeasuresmentioned here showhuman concern in
many countriesworldwide over the insuicient protection
of nonhuman primates. However, in all cases the progress
made in the area of animal protection fails to take sui-
cient account of the outstanding abilities and interests of
primates, since none of the present measures guarantee
the fundamental rights of nonhuman primates to life and
bodily and mental integrity. But these are precisely the
rights that are indispensable for nonhuman primates, as
we lay out in the next chapter, “Fundamental rights for pri-
mates”.
Fundamental rights for primates
Why fundamental rights?
Current animal protection regulations worldwide and
their application to the protection of the fundamental in-
terests of nonhuman primates to life and integrity are in-
suicient, since under current law these central interests
of nonhuman primates are not protected anywhere, and
in practice their interests are subordinated to even trivial
human ones. The interests of nonhuman primates need
special legal protection. This protection can only be guar-
anteed through fundamental rights. Fundamental rights
have several central advantages over animal protection
laws:
Fundamental rights possess a core area of protection
that must not be restricted under any circumstances. So,
whilst in the usual area of protection aweighing up of con-
flicting interests is possible (see the subchapter “Restric-
tions to fundamental rights”), the interests of the core con-
tent must never be traded o. This core content of funda-
mental rights guarantees that the most central aspects of
an interest so protected can never be sacrificed to oppos-
ing interests, however great the latter may be. In compar-
ison to simple bans, such as bans on cruelty to animals,
fundamental rights also have the advantage of beingmore
general. This creates room for dynamic future interpre-
tations, which can further the protection provided by the
right. To illustrate: the fundamental right to life guaran-
teed to humans is not simply the counterpart of the crimi-
nal prohibition on murder. For unlike this prohibition, the
fundamental right to life has come to be interpreted so as
to give the state a positive responsibility to protect people
in cases where a killing, a disappearance or a risk to life
is threatened.[68] In other words, fundamental rights are
not limited tonegativebanning, but alsoprovideapositive
steer in the direction of protecting particular interests.
Moreover, fundamental rights have a social function
which is not achieved by simple bans. Things are also
“protected” through bans, but only those individuals that
possess characteristics and interests which are particu-
larly worthy of protection have fundamental rights. Who-
ever falls under the umbrella of a fundamental right en-
joys a higher status than things or beings who do not have
those rights. Bearing fundamental rights also has a so-
cial signalling value: by recognising nonhuman primates
as bearers of fundamental rights, it is impressed upon
other members of society that the interests of primates
are equally valuable as the comparable interests of other
bearers of such rights. This means that the interests of all
individuals who possess the fundamental rights to life of
integrity should be protected equally in relation to these
interests.[69] In this way, bearers of fundamental rights
will be measured by the same yardstick, or to put it an-
other way, they will find themselves on an equal footing
as far as their interests protected by fundamental rights
are concerned. This guarantees that the fundamental in-
terests of nonhuman primates will be taken seriously and
will not be subordinated to trivial human interests. This
function of fundamental rights also explains why histori-
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cally the achievement of fundamental rights was of cen-
tral importance for groups that were not previously taken
seriously by the law. The struggle for fundamental rights
was therefore important for slaves, black people, women,
disabled people and other groups, not only because it
brought with it the prohibition of other injustices, but be-
cause it admitted them into the circle of thosebearing fun-
damental rights.
Since fundamental rightsbringwith themastrong legal
and social protection, they are oen described as “trump
cards”.[70] They protect the interests of their bearers es-
pecially well and even guarantee the core content of such
interests absolutely. Aneicientprotectionof the interests
of nonhuman primates to life and integrity therefore re-
quires a fundamental right to life and a fundamental right
to integrity.
Can only humans have fundamental rights?
Is therea reasonwhyonlyhumans shouldhave fundamen-
tal rights? As was shown above, the species Homo sapiens
does not present a special order of mammal. In fact, hu-
mans comprise only one of over 300 species of primate.
Does thismean that there is no dierence between human
and nonhuman primates? This question of “anthropologi-
cal dierence” has been heavily debated for some time.
Arguments which are oen used as grounds for such a
dierence are rationality, conceptual thinking and capac-
ity for abstraction, the ability to put oneself in the shoes of
another, the possession of a soul, humour, anticipation of
future events or conditions, aesthetic taste, use of tools,
construction of tools, technology, free will, the ability to
follow rules, personality and culture.[71] However, none of
these characteristics and abilities actually present quali-
ties possessed exclusively by all humans and by no non-
human primates.[72] Expressive characteristics and abili-
ties, suchas anaesthetic taste or a complex language,may
indeed be confined to humans, when narrowly defined.
However, they are not characteristics and abilities that all
humans have to the same extent. Young children, people
with severe learningdisabilities andpeoplewithadvanced
dementia donot have these characteristics and abilities. A
few expressive markers, such as the use of tools or con-
sciousness, arguably belong to all humans, but are also
known amongst nonhuman primates and other animals.
Other than membership in the species Homo sapiens,
which is common to all humans, there is no characteris-
tic or ability that could form the basis of an anthropologi-
cal dierence between humans and nonhuman primates.
But falling back upon species membership as a basis for
the conferment of fundamental rights violates the moral
principle of species neutrality, whereby equally ranked in-
terests must be considered independently from species
membership. In principle, rights should be made as inde-
pendent frommembership to a particular species as they
are from membership of a particular gender, ethnicity or
age group.
Moreover, the debate over anthropological dierence
does not only break down because there is no morally
significant dierence between human and nonhuman pri-
mates. Even if therewere such a dierence, the discussion
is on a hiding to nothing: a characteristic that all humans
possess exclusively would at themost justify a fundamen-
tal right protecting that particular characteristic. Funda-
mental characteristics and interests, like those for life and
integrity, belong to nonhuman primates, too.
Justifications
What reasons are there for an individual to have funda-
mental rights? Fundamental rights, as already shown,
serve to protect the particular abilities and interests pos-
sessed by an individual. Below, we set out which abilities
and interests are relevant for nonhuman and human pri-
mates as a basis for their fundamental rights to integrity
and to life.
The fundamental right to bodily andmental integrity
The fundamental right to bodily and mental integrity
serves in the first place to protect its bearers from exces-
sive physical and mental pain.[73] Physical pain means
an “unpleasant sensory experience, which is associated
with current or potential material damage or is described
in terms of such damage.”[74] Some criteria for the defini-
tion of pain can be brought into play: the possession of a
central nervous system, an avoidancemechanism, protec-
tivemotor reactions, suchas reducedusageof theaected
part of the body, physiological changes, compromises be-
tween stimulus avoidance and other motives, opioid re-
ceptors and indications of reduced sensitivity to pain with
the use of local anaesthetics or analgesics, as well as high
cognitive ability and consciousness.[75] Like human pri-
mates, nonhuman primates also have a central nervous
system, learn avoidance behaviour, make compromises
between stimulus avoidance and other motives (e.g. ac-
quiring food), have opioid receptors, show reduced sen-
sitivity to pain under local anaesthetic or analgesic and
have high cognitive abilities and consciousness. Hence,
just like humanones, nonhumanprimates fulfill all the cri-
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teria for experiencingphysical pain.[76] It follows fromthis
that nonhuman primates also have an interest in remain-
ing physically unharmed.
Freedom from mental pain means protection from
psychological suering that reaches a certain minimal
intensity.[77] Not only human primates, but also nonhu-
man primates can be mentally harmed. So the animal
protection law also specifies that the welfare of nonhu-
man animals is only ensured where “harm and fear are
avoided”. From the perspective of evolutionary biology,
there is no indication that nonhuman primates are fun-
damentally any dierent from humans in this regard. As
set out above, nonhuman primates are highly intelligent,
which makes them particularly susceptible to psychologi-
cal traumas. Research on nonhuman primates has shown
that they suer from serious mental illnesses such as de-
pression and other mental disorders because of negative
experiences like social separation, social withdrawal, ma-
ternal neglect or abuse.[78] Sincenonhumanprimates can
suer from such mental disturbances, they have an inter-
est in remaining mentally unharmed.
The fundamental right to life
The death of an individual is oen associated with pain.
Because nonhuman primates are sentient beings who ex-
perience pain, they have a strong interest not to die.
Even if, however, their death could be brought to pass
painlessly, this would not mean that nonhuman primates
had no interest in living. Nonhuman primates have the
ability to look back into the past and to anticipate the fu-
ture. In otherwords, they do not live simply in the present,
but leada transtemporal life. Evenapainless killingbreaks
o this life and violates their preference to live on. More-
over, abilities like the experience of pain serve to avoid
dangerous behaviour and through this to to ensure one’s
own survival, at least temporarily. For these reasons, non-
human primates have a fundamental interest in living. Fi-
nally, life is particularly worthy of protection, because it
forms the logical precondition of all other fundamental
rights, like that to integrity.
Restrictions to fundamental rights
As with those of humans, it is also the case for the pro-
posed fundamental rights of nonhuman primates that
they are subject to certain recognised restrictions. A re-
striction in fundamental rights is possible if it does not vi-
olate the core content, if a legal basis exists, if it is justified
by a public interest or the protection of the fundamental
rights of third parties, and if it is proportionate.
With human primates, as with nonhuman ones, the
fundamental right to life means a prohibition on arbitrary
killing. What counts as “arbitrary” should be measured by
the same standard as is used for human primates. A killing
for the simple purpose of a medical trial or because of a
lack of enclosures would not constitute suicient grounds
and would violate the fundamental right to life. On the
other hand, there would be no violation of this funda-
mental right if a nonhuman primatewere killed to prevent
an otherwise unavoidable serious endangering of another
good (for example, the life of a child). Such a restriction of
a fundamental right is therefore justified if the four criteria
mentioned above for a legitimate restriction are met. The
same is true for the fundamental right to bodily and men-
tal integrity. For humans, too, this right does not guaran-
tee an absolute protection fromphysical ormental restric-
tions.
Nevertheless, it is central that fundamental rights —
despite leaving room for potential restrictions— represent
trump cards that bring their bearers to the same level as
other bearers of fundamental rights in cases of weighing
up interests against one another. Through this, their in-
terests become considerably more protected than the in-
terests of individuals who possess no fundamental rights,
and the core content is absolutely guaranteed.
Objections and responses
A series of objections could be raised against the demand
for fundamental rights to life and bodily and mental in-
tegrity for nonhuman primates, which will be analysed
and responded to below.
Is zoo-keeping justified?
Objection: This demand would lead to the closure of all
zoos!
Response: The demand for fundamental rights to life and
bodily and mental integrity for nonhuman primates does
not mean that no nonhuman primates can be held in zoos
any more. Zoos must simply ensure that the fundamental
rights demanded for nonhumanprimates are observed. In
practice, this means that in relation to the fundamental
right to life, nonhuman primates must not be killed for ar-
bitrary reasons. If this cannot be guaranteed, then zoos
must take suitable action in order not to violate this funda-
mental right. In addition, zoos must guarantee the funda-
mental right of nonhuman primates to bodily and mental
integrity. In general, this would be met if zoos themselves
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did not inflict any physical and psychological harm, and
also took positive measures to avoid such damage.
Is medical research rendered impossible?
Objection: This demand renders biomedical research im-
possible!
Response: Our demand is not directed against biomedical
research. It merely requires that research projects do not
violate the fundamental rights of nonhuman primates to
life and integrity. For example, further research on nonhu-
man primates would be conceivable if it did not overstep
the degree of seriousness 0 — that is, trials that place no
burden upon animals and in which general results are not
significantly restricted.
“Human rights” for primates?
Objection: This demand gives primates human rights!
Response: The claim that the proposals made here give
“human rights” to nonhumanprimates is false. What is de-
manded is simply a fundamental right to life and a funda-
mental right to bodily and mental integrity for nonhuman
primates. These fundamental rights certainly do mirror
the relevant fundamental rights for humans, as the foun-
dations for both sets of rights are the same. However, they
cannot be equated with human rights, since the category
of “human rights” contains more than the two fundamen-
tal rights proposed here by us. For instance, human rights
also encompass the rights to freedomof expression and to
religious freedom. As nonhuman primates do not possess
the characteristics that ground these fundamental rights,
theyalsohaveno interest in these rightsandsononeed for
protection in relation to these rights. Our demand there-
fore does not lead to nonhuman primates being conferred
with all of the fundamental rights held by humans.
Impracticability?
Objection: You can’t give primates fundamental rights, as
this would be completely impracticable!
Response: That nonhuman primates cannot exercise their
fundamental rights themselves does not mean that they
shouldn’t possess any. Many other humanprimates are ei-
ther temporarily (as in the case of small children or coma
patients) or permanently (as in the case of persons with
severe physical disabilities or advanced dementia) inca-
pable of exercising their fundamental rights themselves.
Inmany countries state institutions ensure that the funda-
mental rights of these people are observed, too. The se-
curing of the fundamental rights of nonhuman primates
could be guaranteed in a similar way. The appointment
of an ombudswoman or an independent primate advisor
would be conceivable, to secure the life and integrity of
nonhuman primates.
A slippery slope?
Objection: If we start giving nonhuman primates funda-
mental rights, then soon dogs, cats, cows, rats, and even
insects and plants will have fundamental rights too!
Response: Our current proposal restricts itself to nonhu-
man primates, which, as demonstrated above, possess
characteristics and interests which justify their entitle-
ment to these two fundamental rights. This does not ex-
clude the possibility that other animals presenting the rel-
evant characteristics might also come to enjoy the same
(or other) fundamental rights. These proposals concern
only nonhuman primates because of the particular ur-
gency of the recent failures to recognise them. However,
this doesn’t lead to a “slippery slope”, as first of all it would
need to bedemonstratedwhich other individuals have the
necessary characteristics and interests. Also, fundamental
rights are subject to certain restrictions in any case. Thus,
even if further individuals obtained fundamental rights, it
does not follow that this would prohibit necessary com-
promises.
No rights without responsibilities?
Objection: Primates can’t have any rights, because they
can’t fulfil any responsibilities!
Response: Bearers of fundamental rights don’t have to be
in a position to exercise responsibilities themselves. Small
children and people with severe developmental disabili-
ties or advanced dementia are not in this position, but are
still protectedby fundamental rights. Thiswouldbenodif-
ferent for nonhuman primates.
An undermining of human rights?
Objection: If we give primates fundamental rights, we un-
dermine human rights!
Response: Quite the opposite: our proposal strengthens
humanrights. Current conceptsofhumanrightsarepoorly
underpinned theoretically, as they either support rights
on the basis of membership of the human species (a cir-
cular argument) or fall back upon putatively specific hu-
man characteristics like autonomyand rationality. The lat-
ter line of argument places the fundamental rights of peo-
ple with learning disabilities, small children and people
with advanced dementia on very shaky ground, as many
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of these people are not in fact autonomous or rational to
varying degrees. Supporting arguments are oen used to
secure their rights, such as the argument that such peo-
ple belong to a species whose normal members are au-
tonomous and rational. But these supporting arguments
arenot theoreticallypersuasive: if for example the rightsof
a “normal” person (if one could even agreewhat “normal”
means) were definitive of the rights of a small child, then
every small childwould receive the right to vote andadriv-
ing license, andbeheld criminally responsible to the same
degree as an adult. That such arguments are not plausi-
ble means that the related human rights concepts fail to
justify the fundamental rights of those people who have
most need of them. In contrast to this, our proposal would
forma secure foundation for the fundamental rights of hu-
mans who aremarginalised by conventional formulations
of human rights: small children, severely disabled people
and those with dementia are also capable of suering and
have an interest in living. For precisely these reasons we
must protect their fundamental rights to life and integrity
(as well as all other applicable rights).
Anthropocentrism?
Objection: The demand for fundamental rights for nonhu-
man primates is anthropocentric: it only gives rights to
those animals which are most like humans!
Response: Our demand relates to a particular order of
species (primates) on purely practical grounds. The re-
striction to nonhuman primates is not based on moral
grounds. Other animals need fundamental rights too, if
they have the characteristics and interests necessary to
these rights. From a historical point of view, this approach
is not unprecedented. In thehistory of fundamental rights,
the circle of those bearing rights has always expanded
gradually.
Conclusion
Nonhuman primates are highly intelligent, social beings,
who are capable of suering and have the ability to re-
member past experiences and to plan for future events.
They have a fundamental interest in living and in bodily
and mental integrity. The relevant national and interna-
tional legal regulations hardly take these interests into ac-
count, since the animal protection laws themselves allow
infringements upon the central core of life and integrity,
and in practice the fundamental interests of primates are
subordinated to even trivial human interests. For their in-
terests to be taken seriously, nonhuman primates there-
fore require legal protection which goes further than ani-
mal protection regulations. Fundamental rights oer such
protection. Fundamental rights cause the interests of their
bearers to be recognised as equally valuable, and so their
interests are better protected than those of individuals
who have no fundamental rights. Fundamental rights
are therefore oen described as trump cards. Moreover,
through fundamental rights the core of the protected in-
terests is absolutely guaranteed. Possible objections and
considerations that could be raised against this demand
for fundamental rights for nonhuman primates to life and
integrity show themselves to be unfounded.
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